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Abstract: The paper examines the linkages between foreign direct investment, informal 
sector and transfer of environmentally sound technology (EST) in a developing economy 
in terms of a three-sector, full-employment general equilibrium model with an informal 
sector that produces a non-traded input for the formal final good producing sector. The 
same input is produced by another division of the formal sector, which generates less 
pollution than the informal sector since the former uses a different type of capital that 
embodies EST. The formal sector has to pay a penalty in the form of a production tax for 
using the output of the excessively polluting informal sector. In this scenario, the analysis 
finds that foreign capital inflow in the formal sector may accentuate pollution, even if it 
involves transfer of EST. Secondly, there might exist a positive relationship between 
pollution and national income in the economy both in the presence and absence of 
transfer of EST. These results can at least question the desirability of transfer of EST and 
also give theoretical explanations behind the existence of a positively sloped segment in 
the Environmental Kuznets Curve.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The most exigent task ahead of all the economies perhaps is to strive for environmentally 
sustainable economic growth. The desperate pursuit for economic well-being, particularly 
in the last few decades after liberalization, has triggered colossal environmental 
deterioration. The trade and environment economists consider liberalization as a vector 
for perpetuating environmental damage. Their disapproval stems from the apprehensions 
that any gains from trade liberalization may be substantially outweighed by the damage it 
tends to inflict on the environment through pollution and loss of natural resources. 
 
The role of foreign direct investment (FDI) in environmentally sustainable growth in the 
developing countries has drawn serious cognizance. It is asserted by the pessimists that 
the environmental quality of the developing countries is jeopardized due to their low 
environmental standards, fostering migration of ‘dirty’ industries to these countries (the 
industrial flight hypothesis). In addition, the developing countries may deliberately 
undervalue the environment in order to attract the multinational firms (the ‘pollution 
haven’ hypothesis) ending up in unwarranted environmental pollution in these countries. 
While there exist some empirical evidences that support the pollution haven hypothesis 
(Cagatay and Mihci, 2006; He, 2006; Merican et al., 2007), several studies have rejected 
the phenomenon (Dietzenbacher and Mukhopadhyay, 2007; Eskeland and Harrison, 
2003; Rock, 2002). It is argued that factors like capital abundance, technology 
differences, and infrastructure are more important than environmental policy in 
determining trade and FDI patterns1. 
 
The optimists, on the other hand, highlight the environmental benefits that FDI tends to 
generate. Apart from promoting higher incomes, possibly leading to higher levels of 
                                                 
1
 For detailed discussion, see de Almeida et al (2008). 
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investment in pollution prevention and control facilities, it constitutes an important 
catalyst for the transfer of environmentally sound technologies (EST) to those countries. 
Environmentally sound technologies are those that “protect the environment, are less 
polluting, use all resources in a more sustainable manner, recycle more of their wastes 
and products, and handle residual wastes in a more acceptable manner than the 
technologies for which they were substitutes” (Agenda 21 of the Rio Declaration). 
 
The possibilities of EST transfer associated with FDI have important role in stimulating 
the developing countries to attract FDI, despite the general contention among the trade 
and development theorists that the welfare effects of foreign capital inflow in the 
presence of tariff protection are, in general, discouraging for them.2 However, successful 
transfer of EST depends on both regulatory instruments and market-based mechanisms. 
Strong environmental regulation and enforcement are the main incentives for firms to 
acquire and transfer new technologies, so that to make foreign investment conducive to 
the influx of EST, it is imperative to progressively develop and implement strong 
environmental regulation, nonetheless, allowing for flexibility in the enforcement of 
environmental standards and having positive disposition towards a plant’s 
experimentation with alternative cost-effective solutions (Luken et al, 2008). 
 
Moreover, various direct incentives such as the elimination or reduction of taxes on 
income or sales from investment, the deferment of taxes, tax holidays, and taxation 
graded according to the level of environmental improvement achieved, may be 
instrumental (Juma, 1994; Less and McMillan, 2005) in creating a favourable investment 
environment for EST transfer. Therefore, it is environmentally viable for countries to pull 
                                                 
2
 Brecher and Alejandro (1977) have analyzed the immiserizing effects of foreign capital inflow 
in a two- commodity, two-factor full-employment framework and showed that inflow of foreign 
capital, with full repatriation of its earnings, leads to a reduction in welfare if the import-
competing sector is capital-intensive and is protected by a tariff. Khan (1982) has examined the 
Brecher-Alejandro (1977) proposition in a two-sector Harris-Todaro (1970) framework and 
reached the same conclusion as that of Brecher and Alejandro (1977). This proposition has been 
subsequently re-examined on the basis of two-sector and three-sector models in different 
directions (Grinols (1991), Chandra and Khan (1993), Gupta (1997), Beladi and Marjit (1992), 
Chaudhuri (2001). 
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FDI only if the costs that they have to bear in the form of incentives are outweighed by 
the environmental benefits from transfer of EST. However, empirical evidence on the 
role of FDI in transfer of cleaner technology is rather inadequate and inconclusive. Even 
if the MNCs from developed countries have important roles in terms of cleaner 
technologies, this does not hold for MNCs from developing countries (Zarsky, 1999).3  
 
The environmental impact of FDI on host countries appears even more debatable in the 
developing countries due to the persistence of urban informal sector.4 The presence of a 
large number of pollution sources in the form of informal sector units that lack 
knowledge, funds, technology and skills to treat their effluent, is likely to frustrate 
environmental instruments and policies.  
  
Empirical evidences indicate that the urban informal sector units mostly produce 
intermediate inputs for the formal manufacturing sector on a subcontracting basis.5 In a 
number of cases, the large industries give subcontract to production units that produce a 
component of the formal sector output, mostly involving environmentally “dirty” tasks 
and processes, on an informal basis6. Perrings, Bhargava and Gupta (1995) argue that 
                                                 
3
 See also Dominguez (1998); Jenkins (1999); Jha and Teixeira (1994); López and Chidiak 
(1996) and Levy (1995) in this context. 
 
4
 The informal sector implies that segment of the labour market where free entry exists (due to 
high labour turnover) and wages are significantly lower than in the formal sector. It consists of 
small scale unregistered units, engaged in the production and distribution of goods and services, 
with the primary objective of generating employment and income to their participants despite 
capital constraints. See Sethuraman (1981) in this context. 
 
5
 See for example Joshi and Joshi (1976), Bose (1978), Papola (1981) and Romatet (1983). In 
India the trend of increasing ancillarisation and subcontracting has increased with the introduction 
of globalization package in recent years. For example, many of the large industries like the carpet 
weaving industries, the glass manufacturing industries, the bangles industries, leather bag and 
shoe manufacturing industries, garments industries etc. have been split up into very small units 
and been subcontracted to the informal sector. 
 
6
 For example, in the city of Kolkata, leather-tanning process is handled by the informal sector. 
Similarly, for the garment industry the dyeing of garments are done by the informal sector 
participants on a subcontracting basis. Both tanning and dyeing pollute the environment. 
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such subcontracting is an economical way for formal sector firms to avoid investment in 
ESTs made obligatory by the regulatory authority. This is due to the fact that since the 
informal sector firms are difficult to identify and monitor, they remain outside the 
purview of environmental regulations and face fewer incentives to prevent pollution.7  
The interlinkage between FDI and pollution of developing countries may occur in two 
different ways: first, pollution increases due to subcontracting between the formal firms 
(including the foreign owned ones), and the polluting informal units; secondly, transfer of 
EST in firms where there is no such subcontracting has favourable effect on pollution. 
  
However, there hardly exist any work that focus on the nexus between, FDI, informal 
sector and EST.8 The main objective of the present paper is to examine the effects of an 
inflow of foreign capital on the level of domestic pollution and national income in a 
developing economy in the presence and absence of transfer of EST. A three sector full-
employment general equilibrium model consisting of three sectors, a rural sector, an 
informal and a formal sector has been considered. The formal sector has two divisions, 
one producing a final manufacturing good and another producing a non-traded 
intermediate input for production in the final good sector. The intermediate input is also 
produced in the informal sector. Both the formal and informal intermediate input 
producing sectors pollute the environment. But while the formal sector has access to 
EST, the informal sector uses backward technology, so that the latter generates more 
pollution. The paper shows that under some reasonable conditions, an inflow of foreign 
capital in the formal sector involving greater adoption of EST may actually aggravate 
domestic pollution but increase national income, while foreign capital inflow in the 
informal sector without transfer of EST may reduce pollution despite having adverse 
effects on national income. These interesting results despite simplicity and abstract of the 
analytical framework can at least question the favourable environmental impact of FDI 
even if it involves transfer of EST and suggest a trade off between economic and 
                                                 
7
 For examples of ESTs in individual firms in Brazil, India, China and Zambia, see Perrings, 
Bhargava and Gupta (1995). 
 
8
 Chaudhuri and Mukhopadhyay (2006, 2009) deal with the theoretical aspect of informal sector 
pollution and FDI, but the aspect of EST has not been considered in these. 
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environmental goals for attracting FDI. The analysis also explains theoretically that at the 
initials levels of (per capita) national income the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) is 
indeed positively sloped that has been confirmed by a numerous empirical studies9.  
 
2. The Model 
 
A small, open economy is considered to consist of two informal sectors and a formal 
sector, the latter comprising of two divisions. Thus, there are four sectors in total in the 
economy. Sector 1 is an informal sector that produces an agricultural commodity, 1X  by 
means of labour ( L ) and capital of type K . The informal sector 2 uses the same inputs to 
produce a non-traded intermediate input, 2X  for sector 3.  Sector 3 is the formal sector 
division producing a final manufacturing commodity, 3X  using labour, capital of type N  
and the intermediate input, 2X . The other division of the formal sector (sector m ) also 
produces the intermediate commodity, mX  with the help of labour and both types of 
capital. Thus the intermediate good is produced in both sectors 2 and m , and is entirely 
used up in sector 3. Labour is perfectly mobile between all the sectors. Capital of type 1 
is mobile between the two informal sectors and the intermediate good producing formal 
sector division, while capital of type 2 is mobile between the two formal sector divisions. 
Sector 1 is assumed to be non-polluting10, but the production of the intermediate input 
generates pollution; this implies that the two sectors (2 and m ) producing it and sector 3 
                                                 
9
 It may be noted that the Environmental Kuznets Curve refers to the relationship between 
various indicators of environmental degradation and income per capita. It hypothesizes that 
degradation and pollution increase in the early stages of economic growth, but the trend reverses 
beyond some level of income per capita, so that at high-income levels economic growth leads to 
environmental improvement. This implies an inverted-U-shaped pollution-income relationship. 
Despite considerable controversies, a number of empirical studies validate this hypothesis (See 
World Bank, 1992; Grossman and Krueger, 1995; Beckerman, 1992; Barrett and Grady, 2000, 
among others). 
 
10
 This is a simplifying assumption. A typical agricultural goods producing sector also vitiates the 
environment through use of chemical fertilizers and pesticides. However, the amount of pollution 
generated by the rural sector is insignificant relative to that produced by the manufacturing 
sectors.  
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using it pollute the society. However, the production technology in sector m  is less 
polluting than in sector 2. 
 
The formal sector divisions face an imperfect, unionized labour market where workers 
receive a contractual wage, *W while the wage rate in the informal sectors, W , is market 
determined and *W W> . The aggregate stock of capital of type K  consists of both 
domestic and foreign capital, which are perfect substitutes, while capital of type N  is 
completely owned by foreign capitalists. It is assumed that the agricultural sector is more 
labour-intensive than both the intermediate good producing sectors. The price of the non-
traded intermediate good, 2P  is endogenously determined
11,12
, while the prices of the 
products of the other sectors, iP , i = 1, 3 are exogenously given due to the small open 
economy assumption. Commodity 1 is chosen as the numeraire. It is assumed that the 
technologies of production are of the fixed-coefficient type13. 
                                                 
11
 A pertinent question is why the formal sector (division m ) produces at least a part of the total 
requirement for the non-traded input especially when the informal sector (sector 2) has a cost 
advantage over the formal sector in production of the input. There could be two reasons. First, 
sector m  produces the input in order to avoid complete dependence on the informal sector. 
Second, the production of the intermediate input generates environmental pollution. However, 
due to possession of an improved technology of production, the formal sector is able to produce 
the input in a less polluting manner vis-à-vis the informal sector. In order to put a brake on the 
practice on the part of the formal sector to arrange the production of the input in the informal 
sector through subcontracting, the pollution regulatory authority imposes a penalty on the formal 
sector in the form of a production tax for using the output of the informal sector. The higher the 
use of the output of the informal sector the greater the environmental pollution and the higher 
would be the rate of production tax imposed on the formal sector. Therefore, in order to reduce 
the burden of taxation, the formal sector (division m ) might be producing some amount of the 
non-traded input.  
 
12
 The price of the non-traded input must be the same across sectors. Even if the prices of the 
input produced in sector 2 and m  differ initially, competitive forces would ultimately lead to the 
uniform price, 2P . 
 
13
 This is basically a simplifying assumption. Let us discuss intuitively what happens if 
production technologies are of the variable coefficient type. Since the production structure is 
indecomposable, any changes in factor endowments (e.g. resulting from inflows of foreign 
capital) would change factor prices and hence the factor coefficients ( jia s) which in turn would 
produce secondary changes in the output composition apart from the primary (direct) effects on 
the output composition. The primary effects usually dominate the secondary effects with or 
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The general equilibrium of the model is given as follows. 
 
Given the assumption of perfectly competitive markets, the usual price-unit cost equality 
conditions relating to the sectors of the economy are given by the following equations, 
respectively. 
 
1 1 1L KWa ra+ =  (1) 
2 2 2L KWa ra P+ =  (2) 
*
2Lm Km NmW a ra Ra P+ + =  (3) 
*
3 3 2 23 3 2[1 ( )]L NW a Ra P a P t X+ + = −  (4) 
 
Here Lia  denotes the labour-output ratio in sector i , i = 1, 2, m , 3; Kia  denotes the 
capital (of type K ) -output ratio in sector i , i = 1, 2, m ; Nia  denotes the capital (of type 
N ) -output ratio in sector i , i = m , 3; 23a  is the amount of  2X  required to produce one 
unit of output in sector 3; r  and R  denote the returns to capital of type 1 and 2 
respectively.  It is reasonable to assume that sector 1 is less capital-intensive relative to 
sector 2 in both physical and value sense implying 1 2 2 1( ) 0L K L Kθ θ θ θ θ= − >  and 
12
1 2 2 1( ) 0L K L KLKλ λ λ λ λ= − >  where jiθ  is the distributive share of the j th input in the i th 
sector for , ,j L K N= and 1, 2,3,i m= ; for example, 22
2
( )KK
ra
P
θ =  and jiλ is the allocative 
                                                                                                                                                 
without sufficient conditions. In the present case, where there are fixed-coefficient technologies, 
the secondary effects are absent. So, by relaxing the assumption of fixed-coefficient technologies 
no additional insights can be obtained. It would only complicate the algebra of the model, 
involving terms with elasticities of substitution between factors of production, kjiS s where 
k
jiS is 
the elasticity of substitution between factors j and i in sector k (i.e. ( / )( / )kji j ji ji jS W a a W= ∂ ∂ . 
Besides, our objective here is to show that there can be cases where foreign capital inflows 
accompanied by transfer of EST might be counterproductive and there might exist a positive 
relationship between the pollution level and national income. Our purposes are served if we can 
establish these results even in a simplified structure like the present one. 
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share of the j th input in the i th sector for , ,j L K N= and 1, 2,3,i m= ; for example, 
3 3
3 *( )NN
a X
N
λ = . 
  
Since the sub-sector m  within the formal sector produces the intermediate input in a less 
polluting manner, it is likely that the pollution regulatory authority (or simply the 
government) directs the formal sector (sector 3) to carry out the production of the input 
entirely in sector m . If sector 3 does not comply with the regulation and arranges for 
production of at least a part of its aggregate requirement of the input in the informal 
sector (sector 2) through a subcontracting system with the intention of cost reduction, the 
government imposes a penalty in the form of a production tax on the formal sector. As 
the production technologies and the production levels by the two sub-sectors of the 
formal sector are known to the regulatory authority, it can easily detect the amount of the 
intermediate input that the formal sector purchases from the informal sector which is also 
the level of production of the latter, 2X . So it is quite reasonable to assume that the 
production tax on the formal sector is a positive function of the amount of the non-traded 
input purchased from sector 2, 2X .  So we have 2( )t t X=  with (.) 0t′ > .  
 
The pollution level in the economy, Z , is a positive function of the production levels of 
the intermediate input in sectors 2 and m . Therefore,  
*
2 ( ( )) mZ X A N Xα β= + ; 0α β> > ; 0A′ > ; 0β ′ < . (5) 
 
Here α  and β  are the proportions of pollution generated in producing one units of 
output in sectors 2 and m  respectively. Since sector 2 uses relatively environmentally 
backward technology, it is assumed that α β> . An inflow of N  results in the residents 
of the host country coming into contact with foreign entrepreneurs possessing superior 
technical skills and know how, leading to technology transfer. Therefore the technology 
parameter, A  in sector m  is a positive function of the level of N  so that 0A′ > . Transfer 
of technology results in less emission of pollutants by sector m  so that 0β ′ < . 
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Complete utilization of labour and capital of types 1 and 2 imply respectively 
*
1 1 2 2 3 3L L Lm m La X a X a X a X L+ + + =  (6) 
*
1 1 2 2K K Km ma X a X a X K+ + =  (7) 
*
3 3Nm m Na X a X N+ =  (8) 
 
Here *L , *K  and *N  denote the endowments of labour, capital of types K  and N , 
respectively. 
 
The supply of 2X  and mX  are circumscribed by their demand in producing 3X . 
Assuming 23 1a = , we may write 
3 2 mX X X= +  (9) 
 
Using (9), equation (5) may alternatively be written as 
3 ( (.) ) mZ X Xα β α= + −  (5.1) 
 
There are nine endogenous variables in the system, 2 1 2 3, , , , , , ,W r R P Z X X X  and mX  that 
can be solved from the above nine equations. This is an indecomposable system where 
any change in factor endowment affects the factor prices and factor coefficients. Here,W , 
r  and R  are obtained from equations (1) – (3) as functions of 2P . Then 1X , 2X , mX  and 
3X  are determined from equations (4) and (6) – (8) as functions of 2P . Finally, 2P  is 
solved from equation (9) and Z is obtained from (5) or (5.1). 
 
The national income at domestic prices, Y, is expressed as follows: 
* * *
3 3 2 3 3[ ( )( )] ( )L Lm m DY WL W W a X a X rK t X P X= + − + + +  (10) 
 
Here * * 3 3[ ( )( )]L Lm mWL W W a X a X+ − +  is the aggregate wage income of the workers 
while *DrK  is the rental income from domestic capital. Finally, 2 3 3( )t X P X  is the 
production tax revenue of the government, which is totally transferred to domestic 
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consumers in a lump-sum fashion. As capital of type N  is entirely owned by foreign 
capitalists, the rental income earned from this type of capital is not included in the 
national income expression. 
 
One may argue that the national income at domestic prices cannot appropriately measure 
social welfare since it does not explicitly contain any social cost due to pollution. While 
admitting this limitation, we can suggest two ways to address this problem. First, if 
instead of physical units we measure labour endowment in efficiency units where the 
efficiency of a representative worker, h , is inversely related to the level of pollution, Z  in 
the economy, we can indirectly accommodate pollution in the economy’s national income 
expression. Environmental pollution leads to health hazards, thus adversely affecting the 
worker’s efficiency. This is because air pollution can lead to irritation, breathing 
problems and lung diseases; water pollution causes contaminated drinking water; 
improper waste disposal management involves significant human pathogens; all these 
contribute directly to reduce human performance. In that case the national income of the 
economy at domestic prices would be given by 
 
* * *
3 3 2 3 3* [ ( (.)) ( )( )] ( )L Lm m DY Wh Z L W W a X a X rK t X P X= + − + + +    (10.1) 
where ( (.))h Z  with (.) 0h′ <  is the efficiency of each worker in the economy. The *Y  
function indirectly incorporates the cost due to pollution. This is because it contains the 
labour endowment in efficiency units, which is negatively related to the level of 
pollution. So, as pollution level rises the endowment of labour in efficiency unit falls 
leading to a decrease in aggregate wage income. It can be checked14 that all qualitative 
results of the model hold under different sufficient conditions despite this modification. 
However, the direct way to measure social welfare in the presence of pollution would be 
to introduce the social welfare function, ( , )S S Y Z=  with ( / ) 0S Y∂ ∂ >  and 
( / ) 0S Z∂ ∂ < . Social welfare rises if national income rises while it falls if pollution rises. 
The net effect on social welfare would then be a matter of value judgment.  
 
                                                 
14
 Interested readers may check these results or can obtain proofs from the authors on request. 
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3. Comparative Statics 
 
Conventional wisdom suggests that an inflow of capital (of type K ) that is used by the 
informal sectors in a developing economy causes the polluting sectors to expand and 
thereby accentuates environmental pollution in the economy. On the contrary, foreign 
capital inflow (of type N ) to the formal sector(s) involving transfer of EST has 
favourable impact on pollution. In this paper, we reanalyze the effects of foreign capital 
inflow, both with and without transfer of EST on the pollution and national income of the 
economy.  Since the production structure that we have considered is an indecomposable 
one, factor prices depend on factor endowments. Hence, an increase (a decrease) in the 
endowment of the j th factor with , ,j L K N= , lowers (raises) the price of this factor of 
production. More specifically, we assume that the returns to both types of capital decline 
as their supply increases following foreign capital inflows. 
 
3.1. Effects of changes in K  and N  on 2P  ,  factor prices and output composition 
 
First, we find out the consequences of foreign capital inflows of either type on the price 
of the non-traded input, different factor prices and on the output composition of the 
economy. These effects would then determine the outcomes of the policies on 
environmental pollution and national income of the economy. Differentiating equations 
(1) – (9) and using the stability condition in the market for commodity 2, the following 
two propositions can now be established.15 
 
Proposition 1: An inflow of foreign capital of type K  unambiguously lowers the price 
of the intermediate good and raises the wage rate. It may increase the return to capital of 
type N  if Kma  is sufficiently high. On the other hand, inflows of foreign capital of type 
N  raise the price of the intermediate good and the return to capital of type K  and lower 
the wage rate if Kma is sufficiently high. 
                                                 
15
 The detailed derivations along with the sufficient conditions can be obtained from the authors 
on request. 
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Proposition 2: As a result of foreign capital inflow of type K  the intermediate good 
producing formal sector expands, while the final good producing formal sector and the 
informal manufacturing sector (sector 2) contract if Kma and/or 3Na  is sufficiently high. 
The agricultural informal sector expands if additionally sector m  is more capital (of 
type N ) intensive vis-à-vis sector 3. On the other hand, an inflow of foreign capital of 
type N  leads to an expansion of both the intermediate good producing sectors and the 
formal final good sector, but a contraction of the agricultural sector under the same set of 
sufficient conditions.  
 
Let us now derive a few important relationships that would be helpful in explaining the 
propositions intuitively. Differentiating equations (1) and (2) we obtain respectively: 
1
1
ˆ
ˆ( )K
L
W rθ
θ
= −  (11) 
2 1
2 2
2 1
ˆ
ˆ[ ]K KL
L L
P rθ θθ
θ θ
= −  (12) 
Again, differentiating (3) and using (12) we obtain 
2 1 1 2 1
1
( )
ˆ
ˆ[ ]K L K L Km L
Nm L
R rθ θ θ θ θ θ
θ θ
− −
=  (13) 
Finally, differentiating equation (4) and using (12) and (13) one finds 
2
2 2
1
ˆ ˆ( )AX P
A
= −  (14) 
where: 21
2
0
1 ( )
t XA
t X
′
= >
−
 and 32 1 2 1 2 1 23{( )( )}N L K K L L KmA
θ θ θ θ θ θ θ θ
θ
= − − + ; 
and, 1 2 1 2( ) 0Nm L K K Lθ θ θ θ θ θ= − >   (15) 
 
Propositions 1 and 2 can be verbally explained as follows. As the production structure 
considered in this paper is indecomposable, factor prices and factor endowments are 
inversely related. An inflow of foreign capital of type K  lowers its return, r , since the 
supply of this input rises given its demand. To satisfy the zero-profit condition in sector 1 
(equation 1) it follows that the competitive wage rate in the informal sector,W , must rise. 
Due to changes in W and r , from the zero-profit condition of sector 2 (equation 2) it 
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follows that the price of the non-traded input, 2P , must also change. However, the 
direction of the change must depend upon the relative factor intensities of sectors 1 and 2. 
Our analysis (see equation 12) shows that 2P  must fall as sector 2 is more capital-
intensive vis-à-vis sector 1. Since both r  and 2P  fall, from the zero-profit condition of 
sector m  (equation 3), we find that the effect on the return to capital of type N  i.e. R  is 
somewhat inconclusive. However, from equation (13) it is easy to verify that R  rises if 
2Km Kθ θ≥  i.e. if 2Km Ka a≥ . The direction of change of the output of sector 2 i.e. 2X  
should come out from the zero-profit condition of sector 3 (equation 4). From equations 
(14) and (15) we see that sector 2 contracts i.e. 2X  falls iff 2 0A < i.e. if 3Na and/or Kma is 
adequately high.16  Sector 2 releases labour and capital of type K  to the other sectors. As 
a result, sector m  definitely expands; sector 1 also expands if sector 3 is more labour-
intensive relative to sector m  with respect to capital of type N . As sector m  expands, 
capital of type N  is drained out of sector 3 to the expanding sector m . Consequently, 
sector 3 contracts for dearth of capital.   
 
The effects of an inflow of foreign capital of N  type can be similarly explained in the 
opposite fashion with the help of equations (11) – (15). But here one has to start from a 
decline in R . Another important point is that in this case, both sectors m  and 3 using this 
type of capital expand. 
 
3.2. Effects of changes in K  and N  on aggregate pollution with and without transfer of 
EST 
 
Differentiating equation (5.1) and using different expressions which have already been 
derived17 the following proposition can easily be established.18 
                                                 
16
 The proofs are left to interested readers. 
 
17
 The detailed derivations can be obtained from the authors on request. 
 
18
 The proofs are left to interested readers. 
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Proposition 3: An inflow of foreign capital inflow of type K  reduces the pollution level 
in the economy. Foreign capital inflow (of N  type) in the formal sector raises pollution 
without transfer of EST if Kma and/or 3Na is adequately high, as well as with a transfer of 
EST under an additional sufficient condition. 
 
The intuitive explanations of proposition 3 are fairly straightforward. From equations (5) 
and (5.1) it is evident that the consequence on the aggregate pollution in the economy of 
an inflow of foreign capital of either type depends on the changes in the intersectoral 
output composition. Although sectors 2 and m  are the two polluting sectors, sector 2 is 
more polluting vis-à-vis sector m . If both the polluting sectors expand pollution 
increases unambiguously. On the other hand, if sector m  (i.e. mX ) expands at the cost of 
sector 2 ( 2X ) and the aggregate production of the polluting commodity ( 2 3mX X X+ = ) 
does not at least increase, the society does have a lower level of pollution. In proposition 
2 we have seen that an inflow of foreign capital of K  type leads to an expansion of sector 
m  and contractions in both sectors 2 and 3. So the share of the less polluting sector rises 
in a falling aggregate production of the polluting commodity thereby leading to an 
unambiguous reduction in the aggregate pollution level in the economy. On the contrary, 
when capital of type N  flows in, both the polluting sectors expand and the economy’s 
level of pollution rises unambiguously in the absence of transfer of EST. Finally, when an 
inflow of capital of type N  is accompanied by a transfer of EST that lowers the level of 
pollution generated per unit of output ( β ) by sector m , aggregate pollution may still 
increase because of two reasons. First, mXβ  can increase even when β  falls if mX rises 
sufficiently. Secondly, even if mXβ  falls, the increase in 2Xα  may dominate the fall in 
mXβ .          
 
3.3.  Effects of changes in K  and N  on national income 
 
Now we analyze the consequences of foreign capital inflows of either type on national 
income of the economy. Here the expression for national income at domestic prices is 
given by equation (10). Capital of type K  consists of both domestic capital and foreign 
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capital, which are perfect substitutes. On the contrary, capital of type N  is completely 
owned by foreign capitalists. Foreign capital income of either type is completely 
repatriated. Totally differentiating equation (10) and using different expressions that have 
already been derived19 one can prove the following proposition.20 
Proposition 4: Foreign capital inflow of type K  reduces national income if (i) 
Kma and/or 3Na  is adequately high; and, (ii) * 1 1 2 2( )D K KK a X a X≥ +  while an inflow of 
capital of type N  raises national income under the same pair of sufficient conditions.  
 
 
We note that sectors 3 and m (two formal sectors) are the two higher wage-paying sectors 
vis-à-vis sectors 1 and 2 (two informal sectors) since *W W> . As stated in proposition 1, 
an inflow of foreign capital of type K  raises the competitive wage, W , lowers the return 
to this capital, r and raises the return to capital of type N , i.e. R .  This also leads to an 
expansion (a contraction) of sector m  (sector 3) (see proposition 2) if Kma and/or 3Na  is 
sufficiently high. So, there would be a reallocation of labour between the higher and 
lower wage-paying sectors. We call this the labour reallocation effect. However, it cannot 
be predicted unequivocally how this effect impinges on national income since the change 
in aggregate wage income would be ambiguous because of the following reasons: (i) 
W rises; (ii) sector 3 contracts; and, (iii) sector m  expands. On the other hand, return to 
domestic capital falls unambiguously affecting national income adversely. Finally, as 
sector 2 contracts, the rate of pollution tax, t , on sector 3 falls. Besides, as sector 3 
contracts, the aggregate pollution tax revenue, which is transferred to consumers, also 
decreases. We call this the pollution tax revenue effect that also works negatively on 
national income. Our analysis shows that even if aggregate wage income rises, it would 
be outweighed by the decline in domestic capital income if the size of domestic capital 
                                                 
19
 Interested readers may derive these results. 
 
20
 The detailed derivations can be obtained from the authors on request. 
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stock (of type K ) were sufficiently large,21 so that national income of the economy 
plummets. 
 
On the contrary, an inflow of foreign capital of type N  lowers both W  and R  but raises 
r (see proposition 1). Furthermore, sector 2 contracts while both sectors m  and 3 expand. 
The effect on aggregate wage income is again ambiguous. But it is easily seen that the 
increase in return to domestic capital dominates the change in aggregate wage income if 
the size of domestic capital stock (of type K ) is adequately large.22 Besides, the pollution 
tax rate on sector 3 rises as sector 2 expands. The aggregate tax revenue, 2 3 3( )t X P X , 
definitely rises as sector 3 also expands. National income at domestic prices, therefore, 
augments.   
 
 
4.  Concluding remarks 
 
A major problem for the developing countries in regulating environmental standards is 
the persistence of a vast informal sector. Large industries shift their production to 
informal sector firms, mostly involving environmentally “dirty” tasks and processes on a 
subcontracting basis, mainly because it is an economical way for the former to avoid 
investment in environmentally sound technologies (ESTs) made obligatory by the 
regulatory authority. FDI constitutes an important catalyst for the transfer of ESTs, which 
protect the environment and are less polluting, to the developing economies. Various 
direct fiscal incentives such as the elimination or reduction of taxes on income or sales 
from investment, tax holidays, and taxation graded according to the level of 
environmental improvement achieved are provided to foreign capitalists so as to create a 
favourable investment environment for EST transfer.  
 
However, there are different types of capital used in the different sectors of a developing 
economy. Some of them are used by both formal and informal sectors while the rest are 
used solely in the formal sector. There is possibility of transfer of EST only through 
                                                 
21, 22
 The proofs are left to interested readers. 
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inflows of those of types of foreign capital which are utilized in the formal sector alone. 
Therefore, from the point of view of pollution abatement, the inflow of this type of 
capital should be preferred to the type of capital that is used by both formal and informal 
sectors. Besides, inflows of different types of capital are likely to produce dissimilar 
effects on the national income of the economy. The theoretical literature on trade and 
environment has not yet examined the linkages between FDI, informal sector and transfer 
of EST in a developing economy. The paper is purported to fill in this gap by developing 
a three sector full-employment general equilibrium model consisting of three sectors, a 
rural sector, an informal and a formal sector. The formal sector has two divisions, one 
producing a final manufacturing good and another producing a non-traded intermediate 
input for production in the final good sector. The intermediate input is also produced in 
the informal sector. The formal and informal intermediate input producing sectors pollute 
the environment, although owing to use of a different type of capital that embodies 
transfer of EST, the formal intermediate sector produces less pollution than the informal 
sector per unit of output.  
 
We find that there might exist a positive relationship between pollution and national 
income in the economy. An inflow of the type of foreign capital which is used both in the 
formal and informal sectors lowers both pollution and national income while an inflow of 
capital that is used solely in the formal sectors, both in the presence and absence of 
transfer of EST, produces exactly the opposite effects under some reasonable conditions. 
Despite simplicity and abstraction, the results of the model are interesting as they can at 
least question the desirability of transfer of EST especially when it may fail to contain 
pollution. Finally, the results also explain theoretically that at the initials levels of (per 
capita) national income, the Environmental Kuznets Curve (EKC) is indeed positively 
sloped that has been confirmed by numerous empirical studies.  
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